The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games

DOI10.1145/2344422.2344426zbMath1295.91021OpenAlexW2618717009MaRDI QIDQ3189079

Chaitanya Swamy

Publication date: 9 September 2014

Published in: ACM Transactions on Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2344422.2344426

zbMATH Keywords

convex optimizationprice of anarchyalgorithmic game theoryrouting and congestion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Small world graphs, complex networks (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C82) Convex programming (90C25) Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (12)

The limit of targeting in networks ⋮ On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games ⋮ Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess paradox considering elastic demand ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Non-atomic one-round walks in congestion games ⋮ Congestion games with priority-based scheduling ⋮ Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions ⋮ System optimal routing of traffic flows with user constraints using linear programming ⋮ The price of anarchy of affine congestion games with similar strategies ⋮ A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time ⋮ On Stackelberg strategies in affine congestion games ⋮ Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies

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