Monotonic Maximin: A Robust Stackelberg Solution against Boundedly Rational Followers

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-02786-9_8zbMATH Open1435.91047OpenAlexW2137083510MaRDI QIDQ3190041

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Publication date: 15 September 2014

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02786-9_8

zbMATH Keywords

expected utilityStackelberg gamemixed strategysolution conceptmultiagent system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mixed integer programming (90C11) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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