Pricing and alliance selection for a dominant retailer with an upstream entry
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Publication:319055
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2014.11.004zbMath1346.90201OpenAlexW2000732180MaRDI QIDQ319055
Zong-Hong Cao, Yong-Wu Zhou, Yuan-Guang Zhong
Publication date: 6 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.11.004
Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)
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Cites Work
- Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition
- When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?
- Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant
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- Informative advertising and entry deterrence: A Bertrand model
- Pricing and volume discounting for a dominant retailer with uncertain manufacturing cost information
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- Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects
- Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry
- Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
- On the Effects of Downstream Entry
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- On the Effects of Entry
- Determination of suppliers' optimal quantity discount schedules with heterogeneous buyers
- Game Theoretic Applications in Supply Chain Management: A Review
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