A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:319240
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2014.12.027zbMath1346.91020OpenAlexW2006411340MaRDI QIDQ319240
Surajit Borkotokey, Sudipta Sarangi, Rajnish Kumar
Publication date: 6 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.12.027
Related Items (5)
A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size ⋮ Probabilistic network values ⋮ Cooperative interconnection settlement among ISPs through NAP ⋮ Marginality and Myerson values ⋮ Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies
Cites Work
- Weighted Banzhaf power and interaction indexes through weighted approximations of games
- A new weight scheme for the Shapley value
- Minimum norm solutions for cooperative games
- A linear proportional effort allocation rule
- The family of least square values for transferable utility games
- New mathematical properties of the Banzhaf value
- An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations
- The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
- Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
- Weighted position values
- Shortest path games
- Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
- Allocation rules for network games
- A new rule for source connection problems
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- A characterization of the position value
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- On the Position Value for Communication Situations
- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- The Banzhaf value and communication situations
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
- A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
This page was built for publication: A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions