A Lagrangian approach to the winner determination problem in iterative combinatorial reverse auctions

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.01.053zbMath1346.91100OpenAlexW1992854011MaRDI QIDQ319409

Elkafi Hassini, Bahareh Mansouri

Publication date: 6 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.01.053

zbMATH Keywords

Lagrangian relaxationiterative auctionsreverse multi-unit combinatorial auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Integer programming (90C10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Winner determination with sustainable-flexible considerations under demand uncertainty in transportation service procurement auctions ⋮ Optimal pricing in iterative flexible combinatorial procurement auctions ⋮ Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets

Uses Software

• CPLEX

Cites Work

• BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
• Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items
• The stochastic bid generation problem in combinatorial transportation auctions
• Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
• Unnamed Item

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