CREDIBILISTIC BIMATRIX GAME WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: BAYESIAN OPTIMISTIC EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY
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Publication:3195017
DOI10.1142/S0218488513400072zbMath1322.91004OpenAlexW2055245565MaRDI QIDQ3195017
Publication date: 21 October 2015
Published in: International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218488513400072
credibility measurefuzzy payoff(\(\alpha\), \(\beta\))-optimistic equilibrium strategyBayesian optimistic equilibrium strategycredibilistic bimatrix game
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