Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.030zbMath1346.91145OpenAlexW2019495088WikidataQ41872636 ScholiaQ41872636MaRDI QIDQ319757

Stefan Wrzaczek, Peter M. Kort

Publication date: 6 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.030

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydynamic programmingeconomics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Dynamic programming (90C39) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (6)

On a class of hybrid differential games ⋮ Opening the source code: the threat of forking ⋮ Advertising a product to face a competitor entry: a differential game approach ⋮ Zeno points in optimal control models with endogenous regime switching ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

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• The Leitmann-Schmitendorf advertising game with \(n\) players and time discounting
• Anticipation in innovative investment under oligopolistic competition
• Capital accumulation games of infinite duration
• Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
• Dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs
• Uncertainty and entry deterrence
• Dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs: A differential game approach
• Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly
• Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model

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