On the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system: first-mover advantage vs. robustness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:319764
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.043zbMath1346.91032OpenAlexW2086238455MaRDI QIDQ319764
Jun Zhuang, Mohammad E. Nikoofal
Publication date: 6 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.043
Related Items (7)
A game theoretic model for resource allocation among countermeasures with multiple attributes ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis under partial information ⋮ A survey on bilevel optimization under uncertainty ⋮ On Bilevel Optimization with Inexact Follower ⋮ Defense and attack for interdependent systems ⋮ Defense and attack of performance-sharing common bus systems ⋮ Multi-objective Stackelberg game model for water supply networks against interdictions with incomplete information
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender-attacker game
- A Blotto game with multi-dimensional incomplete information
- Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist
- Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
- Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
- A Blotto game with incomplete information
- Robust discrete optimization and network flows
- Robust game theory
- The Colonel Blotto game
- Confronting Entrenched Insurgents
- A Robust Optimization Approach to Inventory Theory
- Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
- Systems defense games: Colonel blotto, command and control
- Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game
- Target-Hardening Decisions Based on Uncertain Multiattribute Terrorist Utility
- Adversarial Risk Analysis
- A Two-Sided Optimization for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
This page was built for publication: On the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system: first-mover advantage vs. robustness
