National-strategic investment in European power transmission capacity
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.05.056zbMath1346.91181OpenAlexW3124636162MaRDI QIDQ319955
Publication date: 6 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.462980.de/dp1379.pdf
electricity transmissiongeneralized Nash equilibrium (GNE)mixed-integer equilibrium problem under equilibrium constraints (MI-EPEC)network expansion
Mixed integer programming (90C11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (13)
Cites Work
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