Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
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Publication:320139
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.039zbMath1346.91095OpenAlexW1135104811MaRDI QIDQ320139
Publication date: 6 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.039
Related Items (5)
Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets ⋮ Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders ⋮ Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory ⋮ Renewable auctions: bidding for real options ⋮ Ex anteandEx postSubcontracting between Two Competing Bidders
Cites Work
- On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
- Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
- Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
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