Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.039zbMath1346.91095OpenAlexW1135104811MaRDI QIDQ320139

Aadhaar Chaturvedi

Publication date: 6 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.039

zbMATH Keywords

purchasingasymmetric auctionsauctions/bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets ⋮ Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders ⋮ Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory ⋮ Renewable auctions: bidding for real options ⋮ Ex anteandEx postSubcontracting between Two Competing Bidders

Cites Work

• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs

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