scientific article
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3204946
zbMath0415.90011MaRDI QIDQ3204946
Publication date: 1979
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
votingsocial choice functionsdefinitions of strategic manipulationmanipulation under all circumstancespotential manipulation
Related Items
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures, Strategy-proof social choice correspondences., Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems, Inferring probability comparisons, A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions, On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness, Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain, On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions, Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities, Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies, On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering, A unifying impossibility theorem, Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties, Manipulation and the Pareto rule, Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions, Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness, Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity, Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings, Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate, Signed orders and power set extensions, Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions, Uncertainty aversion in nonprobabilistic decision models, Rawlsian maximin, Dutch books, and non-additive expected utility, A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
