A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
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Publication:3206608
DOI10.2307/1914198zbMath0416.90006OpenAlexW1972279751MaRDI QIDQ3206608
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914198
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