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Publication:3208356
zbMath0417.90001MaRDI QIDQ3208356
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry R. Green
Publication date: 1979
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Nash equilibriaincentivesgame theoretic modeldominant strategyelementary expositionpublic decision-makinglarge economiesPareto optimal outcomesClark-Groves mechanismincentive compatibility requirementsmanipulation by coalitionssatisfactory mechanismstruthful strategies
Decision theory (91B06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)
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