Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
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Publication:3220287
DOI10.2307/2297615zbMath0555.90011OpenAlexW2060441137WikidataQ56909027 ScholiaQ56909027MaRDI QIDQ3220287
Roger Guesnerie, Jean Tirole, Xavier Freixas
Publication date: 1985
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297615
asymmetric informationratchet effectincentive schemeCentral planning of productionmacroeconomic policy making
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