Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
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Publication:3220293
DOI10.2307/2297617zbMath0555.90022OpenAlexW2075535574MaRDI QIDQ3220293
David K. Backus, John Driffill
Publication date: 1985
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297617
Bayesian learningrational expectationsmixed strategieschange in regimedynamic path of an economygame between the government and the private sectormacroeconomic policy game
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