Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024zbMath1346.91130OpenAlexW2195725622MaRDI QIDQ322585

Weixiang Huang, Wen-Hui Zhou

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024

zbMATH Keywords

subsidycontract designsenvironmental performanceproduct design and pricingsustainable operations management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (6)

Strategy analysis of governments and new energy product manufacturers and consumers based on evolutionary game model ⋮ Government subsidies for green technology development under uncertainty ⋮ Assessing subsidy policies for green products: operational and environmental perspectives ⋮ How much is enough? Government subsidies in supporting green product development ⋮ Competitive advantage of qualified WEEE recyclers through EPR legislation ⋮ Information investment and sharing in a two-echelon supply chain under government subsidy and consumer preference for energy-saving products

Cites Work

• Consumer environmental awareness and channel coordination with two substitutable products
• Design for the environment: impact of regulatory policies on product development
• Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains
• Pricing, market coverage and capacity: can green and brown products co-exist?
• The carbon-constrained EOQ

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