Generous, spiteful, or profit maximizing suppliers in the wholesale price contract: a behavioral study

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.02.022zbMath1346.90162OpenAlexW3121569044MaRDI QIDQ323179

Panos Kouvelis, Julie A. Niederhoff

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.02.022

zbMATH Keywords

supply chain managementcontractingnewsvendorbehavioral ORsupplier pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (7)

Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible ⋮ Coordinating a closed loop supply chain with fairness concern by a constant wholesale price contract ⋮ Managing the misbehaving retailer under demand uncertainty and imperfect information ⋮ Internal and external reference effects in a two-tier supply chain ⋮ Limited-trust equilibria ⋮ Rawlsian fairness in push and pull supply chains ⋮ Inequity aversion in dynamically complex supply chains

Cites Work

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• Channel coordination under fairness concerns and nonlinear demand
• Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?
• Decision Bias in the Newsvendor Problem with a Known Demand Distribution: Experimental Evidence
• Reference Dependence in Multilocation Newsvendor Models: A Structural Analysis
• Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• The Risk-Averse (and Prudent) Newsboy

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