Licensing under general demand and cost functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:323239
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.01.057zbMath1346.91147OpenAlexW2271187063MaRDI QIDQ323239
Debapriya Sen, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
Publication date: 7 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/73980/1/MPRA_paper_73980.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (5)
Strategic technology licensing in a supply chain ⋮ Cooperation regarding technology development in a closed-loop supply chain ⋮ Price competition and technology licensing in a dynamic duopoly ⋮ Optimal pricing policy design for selling cost-reducing innovation in Cournot games ⋮ Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: general results
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Licensing radical product innovations to speed up the diffusion
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- Is a unique Cournot equilibrium locally stable?
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- Welfare reducing licensing.
- On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
- Anti-norms on finite von Neumann algebras
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Superadditivity inequalities
- Tests for the Superadditivity of Functions
- Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods
- Comparative Statics for Oligopoly
- Some Relationships Between Locally Super-Additive Functions and Convex Functions
This page was built for publication: Licensing under general demand and cost functions
