The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.04.040zbMath1346.91137OpenAlexW2405595995MaRDI QIDQ323456

Claudio A. Bonilla, Jean P. Sepulveda, Marcos Vergara

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repositorio.udd.cl/bitstream/handle/11447/241/wp31.pdf?sequence=1

zbMATH Keywords

double-sided moral hazardequity shareventure capital

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (5)

Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns ⋮ Investment and operational decisions for start-up companies: a game theory and Markov decision process approach ⋮ Cooperation royalty contract design in research and development alliances: help vs. knowledge-sharing ⋮ A dynamic model for venture capitalists' entry-exit investment decisions ⋮ Optimal contingent payment mechanisms and entrepreneurial financing decisions

Cites Work

• Venture capital, staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty
• Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis
• Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
• The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
• Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts

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