Identification of payoffs in repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.004zbMath1394.91034OpenAlexW2493453559MaRDI QIDQ324145

Colin Stewart, Byung-Soo Lee

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbest-response equivalencepayoff identification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Empirical framework for two-player repeated games with random states

Cites Work

• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• Best response equivalence
• The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Identifying Higher-Order Rationality
• General revealed preference theory
• Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable
• An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs

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