On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.005zbMath1394.91154OpenAlexW2513903782MaRDI QIDQ324157

Emin Karagözoğlu, Gary E. Bolton

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/36834

zbMATH Keywords

experimentscredibilitybargaininghard leveragesoft leverage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (7)

Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority ⋮ Effect of reduced opportunities on bargaining outcomes: an experiment with status asymmetries ⋮ Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis ⋮ Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study ⋮ Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle
• Dividing justly in bargaining problems with claims
• Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers
• Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort
• Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study
• The Bargaining Problem
• Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
• Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior
• Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
• Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic

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