Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
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Publication:324169
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.002zbMath1394.91156OpenAlexW2514683753MaRDI QIDQ324169
Ninghua Du, C. Bram Cadsby, Jun Zhang, Ruqu Wang
Publication date: 10 October 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/repec/workingpapers/2015/2015-01.pdf
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