Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008zbMath1394.91084OpenAlexW2474968001MaRDI QIDQ324180

Salvatore Nunnari, Jan Zapal

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsquantal responselegislative bargaininggambler's fallacy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

A bargaining experiment with asymmetric institutions and preferences ⋮ Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments ⋮ Legislative bargaining with teams ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis

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