Equilibrium with mutual organizations in adverse selection economies

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0918-3zbMath1367.91104OpenAlexW2248201513MaRDI QIDQ324337

Adam Blandin, John H. Boyd, Edward C. Prescott

Publication date: 11 October 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp717.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

signalinginsuranceadverse selection equilibriummutual organizationthe coretheory of value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection

Cites Work

• Financial intermediary-coalitions
• General equilibrium theory and increasing returns
• The no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Perfect Competition and the Core
• Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• VALUATION EQUILIBRIUM AND PARETO OPTIMUM
• Unnamed Item

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