Designing insurance markets with moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0911-xzbMath1367.91105OpenAlexW2140147556MaRDI QIDQ324364

Mohammad Hasan, M. Dambrine

Publication date: 11 October 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0911-x

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddecentralizationcompetitive marketsconstrained efficiencynonexclusivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (3)

Optimal reinsurance with multiple tranches ⋮ A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard ⋮ Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard

Cites Work

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• Markets and contracts
• Information-constrained optima with retrading: an externality and its market-based solution
• On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
• A model of equilibrium with differentiated commodities
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• A Competitive Model of Commodity Differentiation

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