The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
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Publication:324692
DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2016.07.012zbMath1390.91129OpenAlexW2490930597WikidataQ60255880 ScholiaQ60255880MaRDI QIDQ324692
Raúl Pérez-Fernández, Michael Rademaker, Bernard De Baets
Publication date: 17 October 2016
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2016.07.012
Related Items (3)
Monotonicity as a tool for differentiating between truth and optimality in the aggregation of rankings ⋮ Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties ⋮ Representations of votes based on pairwise information: monotonicity versus consistency
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