Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
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Publication:325030
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.05.005zbMath1397.91197OpenAlexW2467712998WikidataQ109042890 ScholiaQ109042890MaRDI QIDQ325030
Publication date: 17 October 2016
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.05.005
Related Items (4)
Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction ⋮ Evaluation and strategic manipulation ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
Cites Work
- Picking the winners
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Implementation with evidence
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
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