Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
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Publication:325031
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.06.006zbMath1397.91183OpenAlexW2262978656MaRDI QIDQ325031
Publication date: 17 October 2016
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2015-4.pdf
Related Items (4)
Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents ⋮ Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
Cites Work
- Picking the winners
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- Implementation via backward induction
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: an impossibility and some proposals
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
- Implementation with evidence
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