"Inductive Behavior" as a Basic Concept of Philosophy of Science
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Publication:3259690
DOI10.2307/1401671zbMath0087.24404OpenAlexW2799443965MaRDI QIDQ3259690
Publication date: 1957
Published in: Revue de l'Institut International de Statistique / Review of the International Statistical Institute (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1401671
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