Dynamics in atomic signaling games

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.038zbMath1353.91011arXiv1312.5983OpenAlexW1991471729WikidataQ87095602 ScholiaQ87095602MaRDI QIDQ327123

Behrouz Touri, Jeff S. Shamma, Michael J. Fox

Publication date: 19 October 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5983

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysignalingstochastic stabilitylanguage evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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