Stability in Voting

DOI10.2307/1907685zbMath0094.15401OpenAlexW2330714275WikidataQ55881398 ScholiaQ55881398MaRDI QIDQ3272331

Michael Dummett, Robin Farquharson

Publication date: 1961

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1907685

zbMATH Keywords

applications of probability theory and statistics

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