On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium
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Publication:328545
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0468-8zbMath1388.91040OpenAlexW2155638488WikidataQ59461646 ScholiaQ59461646MaRDI QIDQ328545
Arkadi Predtetchinski, Janos Flesch
Publication date: 20 October 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0468-8
Games in extensive form (91A18) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (6)
Subgame-perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities ⋮ Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games ⋮ Strategic Support of Node-Consistent Cooperative Outcomes in Dynamic Games Played Over Event Trees ⋮ Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version) ⋮ Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels ⋮ Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit
Cites Work
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