On the core and bargaining set of a veto game
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Publication:328547
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0469-7zbMath1388.91018OpenAlexW145770463MaRDI QIDQ328547
Publication date: 20 October 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0469-7
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