Dynamic learning and strategic communication
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Publication:328555
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0474-xzbMath1388.91064OpenAlexW2082395609MaRDI QIDQ328555
Publication date: 20 October 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0474-x
Related Items (5)
Strategic gradual learning and information transmission ⋮ Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk ⋮ Cheap talk with private signal structures ⋮ Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
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