Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0486-6zbMath1388.91136OpenAlexW1411965481MaRDI QIDQ328575

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 20 October 2016

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0486-6

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingcorecooperative equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets ⋮ Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication

Cites Work

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• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
• The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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