What’s so Special About the Gödel Sentence $$\mathcal {G}$$ ?

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-31644-4_13zbMath1436.03309OpenAlexW2499148644MaRDI QIDQ3295825

Mario Piazza, Gabriele Pulcini

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31644-4_13

zbMATH Keywords

incompleteness theoremsprototype proofsstandard and non-standard arguments for truth of Gödel sentence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40)

Related Items (1)

The implicit commitment of arithmetical theories and its semantic core

Cites Work

• On interpreting Gödel's second theorem
• Derivability conditions on Rosser's provability predicates
• Self-reference and the Languages of Arithmetic
• How do We Know that the Godel Sentence of a Consistent Theory Is True?
• Reflections on Concrete Incompleteness
• SELF-REFERENCE IN ARITHMETIC I
• SELF-REFERENCE IN ARITHMETIC II
• A Deflationary Account of the Truth of the Gödel Sentence $$\mathcal{G}$$
• Bell Nonlocality
• On Godel Sentences and What They Say
• A concise introduction to mathematical logic
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: What’s so Special About the Gödel Sentence $$\mathcal {G}$$ ?