When Is a Semi-honest Secure Multiparty Computation Valuable?

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_4zbMath1452.94062OpenAlexW2982037739MaRDI QIDQ3297650

Chris Clifton, Radhika Bhargava

Publication date: 20 July 2020

Published in: (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_4

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilitysecure multiparty computationmalicious and semi-honest models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Zero-knowledge proofs of identity
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity
• The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems
• Fair Computation with Rational Players
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives
• Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination
• Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited
• Universally composable two-party and multi-party secure computation
• Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation
• Secure Multiparty Computation Goes Live
• Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes
• How to Simulate It – A Tutorial on the Simulation Proof Technique
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Bridging Game Theory and Cryptography: Recent Results and Future Directions
• Verifiably Secure Devices
• Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information
• Rationality and Adversarial Behavior in Multi-party Computation

This page was built for publication: When Is a Semi-honest Secure Multiparty Computation Valuable?