Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Against Independent Rational Adversaries
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Publication:3297684
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_33zbMath1457.94197OpenAlexW2981834273MaRDI QIDQ3297684
Kenji Yasunaga, Takeshi Koshiba
Publication date: 20 July 2020
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_33
Game theory (91A99) Cryptography (94A60) Channel models (including quantum) in information and communication theory (94A40)
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