On the Incentive for a Self-Interested Policymaker to Mimic the Behavior of a Social-Welfare Maximizer

DOI10.1007/978-981-10-8615-1_10zbMath1444.91153OpenAlexW2804126604MaRDI QIDQ3298239

Makoto Okamura, Masayuki Hayashibara, Ryoichi Nomura, Takao Ohkawa

Publication date: 14 July 2020

Published in: New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8615-1_10

zbMATH Keywords

benevolent policymakerpartial disguisesurface objectivetariff and subsidy schemetrue objective

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly

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