SELLING IN ADVANCE TO LOSS AVERSE CONSUMERS

DOI10.1111/iere.12429zbMath1444.91128OpenAlexW2979542461WikidataQ127085557 ScholiaQ127085557MaRDI QIDQ3299188

Heiko Karle, Marc Möller

Publication date: 17 July 2020

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/iere.12429?download=true

zbMATH Keywords

informationmonopolyconsumer preferencesmarket performanceadvance purchase

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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