ENHANCING EFFORT SUPPLY WITH PRIZE‐AUGMENTING ENTRY FEES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS

DOI10.1111/IERE.12379zbMath1444.91103OpenAlexW2914803733WikidataQ128591141 ScholiaQ128591141MaRDI QIDQ3299190

Bin Liu, Jingfeng Lu, Robert G. Hammond, Yohanes E. Riyanto

Publication date: 17 July 2020

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jingfeng_Lu/publication/330517957_ENHANCING_EFFORT_SUPPLY_WITH_PRIZE-AUGMENTING_ENTRY_FEES_THEORY_AND_EXPERIMENTS/links/5c69311a4585156b57017dec/ENHANCING-EFFORT-SUPPLY-WITH-PRIZE-AUGMENTING-ENTRY-FEES-THEORY-AND-EXPERIMENTS.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

effortall-pay auctionprize allocationcarrot and stickprize-augmenting entry fee

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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