Performance‐maximizing large contests

DOI10.3982/TE3588zbMath1445.91013OpenAlexW3005518233MaRDI QIDQ3299504

Ron Siegel, Wojciech Olszewski

Publication date: 23 July 2020

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3588

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcontest designlarge contestsoptimal contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (11)

The limits of meritocracy ⋮ Optimal contest design: tuning the heat ⋮ Large Tullock contests ⋮ Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles ⋮ Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns ⋮ Complete-rent-dissipation contest design ⋮ Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests ⋮ Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs ⋮ Winner's effort maximization in large contests ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests

This page was built for publication: Performance‐maximizing large contests