First‐price auctions with budget constraints

DOI10.3982/TE2982zbMath1445.91022OpenAlexW2965955041MaRDI QIDQ3299508

Maciej H. Kotowski

Publication date: 23 July 2020

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2982

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valuesfirst-price auctionbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents ⋮ Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility ⋮ Optimal dynamic multi-keyword bidding policy of an advertiser in search-based advertising ⋮ Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction

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