Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods

DOI10.3982/TE3430zbMath1444.91102OpenAlexW3123860178MaRDI QIDQ3299512

Brian Baisa

Publication date: 23 July 2020

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3430

zbMATH Keywords

wealth effectsmultidimensional mechanism designmultiunit auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (5)

Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples ⋮ Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: a positive result ⋮ Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

This page was built for publication: Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods