Seeing Is Believing: Formalising False-Belief Tasks in Dynamic Epistemic Logic
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Publication:3299577
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_8zbMath1437.03060OpenAlexW2397494983MaRDI QIDQ3299577
Publication date: 24 July 2020
Published in: Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_8
false belief taskdynamic epistemic logic (DEL)observational propositionsSally-Anne taskstandard model events
Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
Related Items (5)
Epistemic planning with attention as a bounded resource ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ A lightweight epistemic logic and its application to planning ⋮ An action language for multi-agent domains ⋮ Incorrect Responses in First-Order False-Belief Tests: A Hybrid-Logical Formalization
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