Dynamic noise from action errors enhances network reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game
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Publication:3302107
DOI10.1088/1742-5468/2015/01/P01033zbMath1459.91023OpenAlexW2021119859MaRDI QIDQ3302107
Takashi Ogasawara, Jun Tanimoto
Publication date: 11 August 2020
Published in: Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/2015/01/p01033
Related Items (10)
Impact of shill intervention on the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Enhancement of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma with a coherence-resonance effect through annealed randomness at a cooperator-defector boundary; comparison of two variant models ⋮ Acceptability of strategy promotes cooperation in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game ⋮ Resonance-like cooperation due to transaction costs in the prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Effects of strategy-updating cost on evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Effect of collective influence on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Interaction between populations promotes cooperation in voluntary prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Evolution of cooperation through aspiration-based adjustment of interaction range in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Reputation-based asymmetric comparison of fitness promotes cooperation on complex networks ⋮ Various error settings bring different noise-driven effects on network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma
Cites Work
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- Cooperation in the snowdrift game on directed small-world networks under self-questioning and noisy conditions
- Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
- Evolution of cooperation facilitated by reinforcement learning with adaptive aspiration levels
- CONTRITION DOES NOT ENSURE COOPERATION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
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