On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents

DOI10.3934/jdg.2016013zbMath1347.91059OpenAlexW2494458442MaRDI QIDQ330281

Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos, Anastasios Xepapadeas

Publication date: 25 October 2016

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2016013

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationregulationreplicator dynamicstax evasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Economic dynamics (91B55)

Related Items (4)

Evolutionary Tax Evasion, Prospect Theory and Heterogeneous Taxpayers ⋮ Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring ⋮ Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers

Cites Work

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• Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Evolutionary game dynamics

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