The profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements

DOI10.3934/JDG.2016007zbMath1391.91093OpenAlexW2153925603MaRDI QIDQ330431

Joana Pinho, João Correia-da-Silva

Publication date: 26 October 2016

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2016007

zbMATH Keywords

collusionasymmetric firmsbalanced temptationcritical discount factorside-payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (2)

Managerial collusive behavior under asymmetric incentive schemes ⋮ Technology licensing and collusion

Cites Work

• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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