Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs
DOI10.1137/20M1323850zbMath1454.91090arXiv1612.03161OpenAlexW3033498332MaRDI QIDQ3304731
Thomas Kesselheim, Michal Feldman, Paul Dütting, Brendan Lucier
Publication date: 3 August 2020
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.03161
optimal stoppingcompetitive analysisonline algorithmsprice of anarchyprophet inequalitiesposted-price mechanisms
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Optimal stochastic control (93E20) Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Online algorithms; streaming algorithms (68W27)
Related Items (18)
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Cites Work
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