A decomposition of strategy-proofness

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0959-yzbMath1392.91064OpenAlexW2317897940MaRDI QIDQ331707

Nozomu Muto, Shin Sato

Publication date: 27 October 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0959-y

zbMATH Keywords

individual bounded responsestrategy-proofness decompositiontop-restricted AM-proofnessweak monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions

Cites Work

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• Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules

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